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Social Media as a False-Self System 
 
 
In the Charlie Brooker-helmed television drama Black Mirror (Ch4/Netflix 2011-present), 
there is a moment in the episode ‘The Entire History of You’ when the two main characters 
Liam and Ffion (played by Toby Kebbell and Jodie Whittaker) are having sex in their marital 
bed. We are witness to their lovemaking as a discernibly passionate encounter full of 
physical satisfaction, signified through energetic heavy-breathing, moaning and sweat. We 
see the couple enthusiastically snatch at each other’s bodies, apprehending each other in a 
grasp of mutual body-recognition – one in the other, each as one whole part of a greater 
union. It is, in other words, a representation of an idealised sexual encounter between two 
people who would seem very much in love. The scene is abruptly intercut with another in 
which the same couple, in the same bed, are still having sex – but something altogether 
disturbing is revealed in this alternating effect. The premise behind ‘The Entire History of 
You’ is based around speculative prosthetic memory technologies, where nearly all of the 
characters in the episode have had a small device implanted in their head called ‘grains’. 
These implants record everything they see, and from these recordings, they are able to re-
watch (and thus to an extent, relive) moments from the past, either privately, or in company 
through television monitoring. This documentation lifestyle is very much an extrapolation of 
the ways in which people have adopted social media technologies to share abundant images 
of their lives. From holiday snaps to breakfast to ultrasound images, photo albums and 
social media galleries and ‘stories’ act as evidence to satisfy the lifestyle clarion call of ‘pics 
or it never happened’. It is also reflective of the normalisation of this evidential behaviour – 
characters who have not had ‘grains’ fitted are considered curiosities, anomalies: much like 
those who have not adopted Facebook and other massively popular Web 2.0 technologies in 
real life, they are outliers.  
 
Throughout the episode, various characters use the playback function to re-examine aspects 
of their lives. Most instances are fun and rather trivial, involving selfies and the production 
of other recordings that can be watched in company on a television screen. In the scene 
described above, it is revealed to us through intercutting that Liam and Ffion use the 
 
 
memory technology to watch playback from recordings of their lovemaking past, in order to 
augment the sex of the present; each viewing their own perspective privately. The 
revelation for us as viewers, sutured into a complicity with the characters thanks to the 
extensive use of point-of-view shots in the episode, is the disturbing realisation that both of 
the characters are entirely focused on their own playback image, rather than the person 
they are actually having sex with. This masturbatory mode of technologically-enhanced 
sexual activity is made all the more alienating to watch because of the blank expressions on 
Liam and Ffion’s faces – exacerbated by the way the technology makes their eyes turn pure 
white when viewing private playback. The sex is consensual, there is little doubt on that 
count – and a conciliatory kiss is shared by the couple once the sex is finished. However, one 
is left with the feeling that both characters are deeply into a privatised experience of 
sexuality – transactional, almost. The kiss signifies care, but there is a discernible distinction 
made between that, and the sexual act, during the course of this particular scene.  
 
The main problem, somewhat ironically (given that many popular cultural representations 
of autosexual activity focuses on the relative dysfunctionality of masturbation), relates to 
the fact that neither character is alone – they are actually in the physical presence of 
another, and so to borrow from Sherry Turkle’s phrase once more, they are ‘alone together’ 
(2011). In some ways the facilitation of solitary fantasy might be more understandable given 
that the other would not be present. In fact, one of the other characters relays such a use 
during a dinner party scene. Furthermore, one might imagine this technology in a more 
positive light where, say, a partner is away working and physical intimacy is simply 
impossible; or perhaps where a disability might hamper physical mobility, and such 
technology is used as an augmentation. In such cases, one might speculate that technology 
can facilitate a relationship. But the scene described in Black Mirror is a case of an 
altogether different kind: it looks routine, perfunctory, joyless. On the one hand, the 
characters have literally objectified one another’s bodies, for the sake of reliving a past 
sexual encounter, and then adding a real-time sexual component to it; on the other, they 
have both literalised the objectification of the other as an image, rather than as a whole 
person. Indeed, the impression we are given is that the other body in this situation could be 
anyone’s. However, because they happen to be married to the person they are watching, 
and to the person they are having intercourse with (although the two experiences are on 
 
 
distinct experiential registers), no adultery is being committed. The evidence from this 
scene, may be summed up in that to an extent, both parties in the marriage are on fairly 
safe moral ground, but ethically-speaking, there are issues around the disruption of 
mutuality in a fully-matured relationship that are troublesome. In addition, the moral status 
of Ffion’s actions come under scrutiny later in the episode, as do the ethics of Liam’s actions 
in the use of the technology and the consequences he sets in motion as a result. 
 
Of course, such disturbing imagery is easy enough to condemn, but the realities of married 
life, with children in the mix, are challenging, and a technology that could conveniently 
augment one’s marital expectations might be viewed as a straightforwardly transactional 
solution. Indeed, these are issues that form a favourite subject of discussion in both popular 
culture, and on the psychotherapist’s couch. In The Divided Self (1965: 86), R. D. Laing 
describes a case in which one of his patients, who otherwise conducted his life along normal 
lines:  
 
[…] could never have intercourse with his wife but only with his own image of her. 
That is, his body had physical relations with her body, but his mental self, while this 
was going on, could only look on what his body was doing and/or imagine himself 
having intercourse with his wife as an object of his imagination. 
 
This account describes in quite stark terms, the fullest expression of false-self as a normal 
pathology in Laing’s thought, and reflects, psychologically, what is literalised in ‘The Entire 
History of You’. Not necessarily an aspect of contemporary culture that is unfamiliar – we 
do, after all, live in image-driven times – nonetheless, Laing drives home the objectification 
apparent in everyday life which has the power to disrupt congress, impoverish what we are 
told should be a moment of absolute intimacy with someone we love the most, through an 
existential pattern of objectification and alienation. The relative pleasures which one may 
experience as a sexual and sexualised being are here offset by a psychic deadness, and a 
disconnect between the inner world of one’s emotions and the outer world of social being. 
It is problematic enough, one suspects, to even countenance the discretion with which inner 
and outer are treated here – as a binary, as if the two are somehow separate aspects of 
consciousness. But given that Laing’s work is often mobilised through dialectical-, rather 
 
 
than picture-thinking, once suspects that this is not his emphasis. Rather, the binary is a 
symptom of the disconnect, and that this disconnect forms through the breakdown of 
mutuality as a principle in our most valued relationships. 
 
So far in Part II of this book, I have discussed similar descriptions of recognition (and its 
disruption) from a number of fields relevant to the study of interpersonal communications 
in Web 2.0 contexts. Having outlined Honneth’s rich description of recognition in light of the 
notion of ‘reciprocated confidences’ and the ‘reciprocally-constitutive’, I offered a strategy 
whereby Honneth’s application of object-relations theory to the concept of recognition 
could be reinforced through the self-psychology of Heinz Kohut, and in particular Kohut’s 
pathology of narcissistic success and failure. This psychosocial mechanism of narcissism in 
self-psychology is the same mechanism that affords the development of mutuality through 
confidence, respect and esteem, in social interaction, and ultimately provides the 
foundation to enable human actors to develop empathy. I progressed this approach by 
describing Kohut’s transhistoric narrative of self-realisation, as a narrative that embodies an 
interpersonal principle of mutuality that encapsulates recognition as a bodily-emotional, 
moral and social phenomenon; and it is this aspect of self-realisation that allowed me to 
tentatively outline a depth and relational approach towards ethical personality (in 
Honneth’s parlance) in social (media) relations.  
 
In this final chapter, I wish to elaborate the depth dimension of this approach, by expanding 
on my discussion of self-realisation as a psychosocial phenomenon that hinges upon the 
recognitive principle of mutuality. I shall do this through discussion of classical and post-
Jungian thinking on persona, as well as drawing from other psychological schools. I then 
engage a specific derivation of the term ‘complex’ from Jungian depth psychology to explore 
the intricacies of authenticity as a recognitive notion in social media interactions. The 
complex in this sense brings together the building blocks of the psyche, often experienced 
as partial personalities in the Jungian terminology, but in addition raises the question of 
‘cultural complexes’ as constellations of psychic and social space interacting and mutually 
impacting. This is, specifically, a psychosocial development of the original term in post-
Jungian thought and psychotherapy (Singer 2000; Singer and Kimbles 2004; Singer 2004; 
Kimbles 2000). In what follows in this current chapter, I hope to make an original 
 
 
contribution to the understanding of the psychology of online interaction, within a 
framework that might describe social media as a false-self system. I begin my discussion by 
developing my application of Laing and his existential approach to psychology. In 
considering his contribution to our understanding of separateness and relatedness as an 
existential equilibrium, we might begin to further understand this as underpinning broader 
social interaction in the relationship between self and other, and how Web 2.0 technologies 
amplify this equilibrium. 
 
Personae, Separateness and Relatedness 
 
The existential-phenomenological work of the psychiatrist and psychotherapist, R. D. Laing 
has been influential in my thinking on the development of personality, social interaction, 
and in particular, familial relationships and their role in the development of an ‘authentic’ 
sense of self. I fully acknowledge that Laing’s approach, and some of his practices, were not 
without controversy. However, his overview of the existential equilibrium of separateness 
and relatedness in everyday pathology, as developed in his influential book, The Divided Self 
(1965) ought to be of particular interest to students of social media. The somewhat under-
acknowledged observations he made on the notion of authenticity in one’s attitude to the 
self, and the parasocial interface of identity, have immediate relevance for the ways in 
which contemporary connectivity shapes how we see ourselves, in relation to others. It 
underpins a sense of self-recognition (through aspects of what might be framed in popular 
discourse as self-esteem) and also the recognition of others (especially in the sense of other-
regarding, and empathy). When read retrospectively, in some ways to my mind at least, 
Laing’s work also pertains to a distinctive Jungian tone. This is especially discernible in the 
implications of his acknowledgement of the role of the imago, the psychological Image, so 
to speak, in the relationship between self and other. His approach draws explicitly from the 
Jungian notion of persona as a structuring archetype. For example, he writes (1965: 95) that 
 
‘A man without a mask’ is indeed very rare. One even doubts the possibility of such a 
man. Everyone in some measure wears a mask, and there are many things we do not 




This concept of social masks, worn to suit the occasion, is a familiar one; as is its application 
to social media interactions, and to Web entrepreneurship, where microcelebrity depends 
largely upon reaching audience segments in ways that tap into popular typology. This is a 
conscious strategy, to build alignments of identification or sympathy, and ultimately, 
audience engagement (and emotional, parasocial investment).  
 
The etymology here is instrumental. As I have often discussed with students when 
examining the performative aspects of Instagramming, or Facebook status updates for 
example, the etymology of persona works as a reminder of what we might already 
intuitively know about persona as a psychosocial mechanism. The persona in ancient Greek 
theatre, referred to the mask a performer wore, symbolising a character’s traits and 
representing something of the character’s inner nature or essence. It signified the true role 
of the character in the drama, for the audience to evaluate and engage with. The 
performance, through use of the persona, invited the audience to infer qualities inherent in 
the wearer, encouraging a belief in the verisimilitude of performance, where the 
masquerade is fully acknowledged as a representation. The performative or dramaturgical 
aspects of this have not gone unnoticed social media scholarship, where aspects of 
performativity lend themselves to the notion of masquerade, and aspects of dramaturgy 
lend themselves to notions of staging, iconography and mise-en-scene. These kinds of 
approaches are noted particularly in social interactionist approaches where the application 
of Goffman’s notion of performance of self in everyday life drew heavily from the 
accoutrements of theatre, staging and performance as an analogy for self-presentation 
(Athique 2013; Goffman 1997; Papacharissi 2010; Walker Rettberg 2008, 2014).   
 
One may take this analogy further, by considering the allegorical and psychic aspects of self-
presentation in social interactions: Jung used the notion of persona to describe the 
phenomenon of social role-playing as a structuring psychic phenomena (or archetype), 
complementary to the social mechanism employed in interpersonal communications. To put 
it another way, persona in the Jungian sense, is the psychic structuring presence refracted 
through the social face an individual presents to the world. It is a psychological figure that 
speaks to both inner and outer dimensions of one’s consciousness, and is essential to self-
expression in social situations, to the relative stability of personality, and to the 
 
 
establishment and maintenance of mature relationships. In his Two Essays on Analytical 
Psychology (1953), Jung described the archetypal notion of persona as ‘[...] a kind of mask, 
designed on the one hand to make a definite impression upon others, and on the other to 
conceal the true nature of the individual’ (1953: 190). So, for Jung (pre-empting Laing), 
persona performs this dual masking function of revelation and concealment to protect the 
sense one has of a coherent self. This facilitates the interpersonal aspects of social life by 
enabling individuals to enter into the risky business of social relationships, through both 
opening ‘oneself’ to others and through protecting those aspects of the personality that lie 
in a more fragile state, akin to ego. This is similar in many ways to the ‘tension gradient’ 
between the various constituents of self, found in Kohut’s self-psychology as discussed in 
Chapter Five, where the materials of our social interactions are defined and realised through 
the distinctions and continuities of self- and other-regarding. This is done, ultimately, in a 
trust-themed everyday drama where both conscious choices and unconscious notions of 
what we ultimately share of ourselves with others, define the relationships we find 
ourselves in.  
 
In his own approach to this relationship structure, Jung tried to account for the depth and 
complexity of the human personality, in its dialogical nature. This dual function of revelation 
and concealment is similar in many ways to subsequent theorisation of the psychological 
notion of ‘false-self’: a social face of personality and that aspect of oneself that presents in 
interpersonal interaction. We have already seen similar notions in the example of Laing, but 
this notion additionally appears in several different traditions in psychology. In another well-
known example, Donald Winnicott wrote that the false-self is a defensive mechanism, 
designed to facilitate personal relationships through ‘compliance’ with what others might 
expect of us (1965). As with Laing’s approach, and to an extent with Kohut, there is a sense 
in Winnicott’s version of false-self, especially in more extreme pathological cases, that the 
presentation of self is a show, masking a feeling of inner deadness or a creeping sense of 
inauthenticity.  
 
In this version, the false-self works in social contexts by deflecting from others’ suspicion of 
one’s detachment from relationships and the world. It also reflects Jung’s version in which 
there is an everyday normal pathology of feeling fake or phoney in some way that leads the 
 
 
individual ego to build a deception or persona as a defence mechanism against emotional 
distress. In Winnicott’s approach, this is built up in infancy, and is subsequently reinforced 
through life, as relationships develop or fall away, and as our social networks are 
established. Through unconscious processes of introjection, internalisation of the 
experience of others and, in more extreme cases, through the imitation and internalisation 
of other people’s behaviour, this false-self comes to be (mis)recognised by others and even 
by oneself as the whole thing, the ‘real me’. This has real-world implications for which 
accelerated forms of misrecognition have developed in social media interactions. I have 
written about the specifics of these implications elsewhere (2017), and this was the topic of 
discussion in Chapter Four, referring to misrecognition as social disrespect. 
 
Although the same individual could ‘put on’ different personas (or personae) in order to 
deal with the various relationships in his/her life (e.g. wife, mother, sister, daughter, 
employee, carer, party animal), these are not just conscious decisions and personal choices 
made to suit the social occasion. For Jung, in the proper sense, the persona is part of an 
intrapsychic apparatus, an ego operation interfacing between one’s internal experiences 
and one’s social being. Where there are obvious, conscious choices to be made in social 
interactions, the psyche uses the less-conscious operations of persona to cope with the 
demands of maintaining sophisticated social relationships by mediating between the 
internal world and the external world. Notions of acceptance and acceptable behaviour, 
awareness of context, collaboration and competition – these interactions all demand a 
complex social interface such as persona, because they impact upon the integrity of one’s 
personality and one’s status as a person with distinct, autonomous interests. To put it 
another way, social compliance places a number of demands upon the individual to curb 
unfettered self-ish-ness, and a functioning persona copes with these demands, helping to 
facilitate a coherent and continuous sense of self. Although rarely referring explicitly to 
theories from classical Jung (a notable exception being Balick 2014b), and even more rarely 
relating to disclosure practices that amount to much beyond conscious strategies for 
finessing social management, these aspects of social interface are fully acknowledged in 
some approaches to the critical study of social media. For example, Mendelson and 




In everyday life, people consciously and unconsciously work to define the way they are 
perceived, hoping to engender positive impressions of themselves. This effort entails 
emphasizing certain characteristics, through dress, hairstyle, behavior and/or speech, 
while hiding or diminishing other characteristics perceived as flawed, depending on 
the context. 
 
This is literalised in everyday practices of ‘Impression Management’ in social media and 
other online interactions. In fact, it is commonplace to use different social media 
applications to facilitate different kinds of social interactions, expectations, and levels of 
relationship intimacy. A number of studies, including social research of practices in 
interactions between teenagers (e.g. Vandebosch et al 2013) show that it is common 
practice to manage multiple FB and SNS profiles for different audiences, expressing different 
public faces or personae for different situations. For example, so-called Rinsta and Finsta 
profiles – respectively, a ‘real Instagram’ profile to interact with one’s peers, and a ‘fake 
Instagram’ profile to work as a decoy to assuage parental anxiety around ‘stranger danger’, 
grooming and other perceived threats to children. The Finsta account is the one that 
(typically) a teenager will allow a parent full access to, using it as a front of sorts to distract 
from activity disclosed on the real account that might be deemed by an authority figure as 
inappropriate, shameful or prohibited.  
 
It ought to be noted that although this is ostensibly deceptive behaviour that most parents 
would hesitate to endorse, it is one mechanism among many through which teenagers are 
able to explore and develop their sense of identity independent of an authority whose 
psychic image comes to symbolise restriction and curtailment upon the development of a 
dignified self with autonomous interests. In Jungian terms, this commonplace adolescent 
response may be read as the ‘trick’ to counter the parental trickster, whose operations 
materialise through surveillance technologies and practices of supervision (as discussed by 
Samuels, 1993). Such are the psycho-political tensions pulling at the heart of the 
separateness-relatedness dialogue in contemporary adolescent life. 
 
On these questions one might return to Laing for a moment. We may also think of his model 
of existential equilibrium at the heart of separateness-relatedness as a departure from the 
 
 
kinds of self-certifying subjectivity found within many classical strands of psychoanalysis. 
This is thanks in part to his acknowledgement of the phenomenological aspects of 
interconnectedness between mind, body and world. This is an influence from French 
existentialism and in particular, the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Merleau-Ponty openly 
saw mass media forms of the Twentieth Century, the cinema especially, as materially 
representative of this interconnectedness (1964). Perhaps most of all, aside from his 
development of the existential approach to imaginative misrecognition of an authentic self 
in relation (especially to others – the focus of discussion in previous chapters, and a topic I 
shall reprise in the next section on data identity) we find in Laing a significant departure 
from the kinds of recognition and authenticated difference found in, for example, the 
Lacanian infant. It is enough, for Laing (and echoing my comments regarding the Jungian 
‘trick’ some moments ago), that we are able to acknowledge the capacity to experience 
oneself as autonomous: ‘that one has really come to realize that one is a separate person 
from everyone else. No matter how deeply committed in joy or suffering to someone else, 
he is not me, and I am not him’ (1965: 52). 
 
This has perhaps obvious applications in the way that we might think of the role of social 
media interactions in the development of adolescent identity more generally, and in the 
social and cultural practices of adolescents whose lives so often embrace the accelerated 
convenience of social media applications. Additionally, in this realisation one might also 
acknowledge the important fact here that late capital societies in general have committed 
to the status of autonomous subject a role as some sort of barometer of free will. That is to 
say, individuation-as-separateness is prized to the degree that, on a psychosocial level and 
within a psychic economy, there appears to have been a fall in the currency of the 
‘relatedness’ vector in the existential equilibrium.  
 
Separateness seems to be considered more valuable, politically- and economically-speaking. 
Aside from institutional commitments such as to one’s family (as an institution especially), 
to community (in the institutional arrangements of such, like taxation, charity donations, 
volunteering and so on) and democracy (a commitment to the procedures of the State, as 
well as to consumerism) relatedness disappears from view. This general shift is noticeable in 
the kinds of loneliness and lack of solitude as discussed in Chapter Five (see also Turkle 
 
 
2015), typical of social interactions in contemporary accelerated media ecosystems 
characterised by always-on, persistent connectivity. It is also reminiscent of the way that the 
experience of capital has been narrativised in the historiography of Western democracies 
more generally, as outlined by Frederic Jameson (1981, 1988) and Max Weber before him 
(2001). This kind of existential disequilibrium therefore sits within the logic of late capital, as 
the privatisation of experience intensifies, and one can imagine the gradual dissipation of 
mutuality accelerate in pace through the myth of connectivity. 
 
The lack of reflective and recognitive space necessary to foster empathy, as I have already 
outlined in previous chapters in relation to Sherry Turkle’s work in particular, may be 
indicative of this problem. However, Laing goes further than this in relation to the feeling of 
autonomy. If we are compelled in this upwards movement, towards individuation (in the 
late capital, rather than the Jungian, sense of the term), then we are robbed of the fullest 
experience of autonomy such that for Laing, one ‘can experience neither his separateness 
from, nor his relatedness to, the other in the usual way’ (1965: 52). The existential 
equilibrium between a sense of separateness and a sense of relatedness is crucial, for Laing, 
to enable individuals to cope with the reality of existential disquiet as social beings.  This 
existential disquiet is the lived knowledge that, expressed in Sartre’s terms, one cannot love 
for someone else, nor can they do the same for me (2001); or in Heidegger’s thought that 
we cannot die another’s death, only our own, towards which, we are thrown (2000). 
 
The Benign and Vicious Circles of Data Materialisation 
 
The added complication of living the disequilibrium through which we hurtle towards a 
mythic point of self-actualization or individuation is that a condition of persistent, semi-
permanent connectivity requires that we give something up willingly in order to participate 
in this journey. It is worth quoting Laing in full here (1965: 52-53), to illustrate the 
‘something’ we give up: 
 
A lack of sense of autonomy implies that one feels one’s being to be bound up in the 
other, or that the other is bound up in oneself, in a sense that transgresses the actual 
possibilities within the structure of human relatedness. It means that a feeling that 
 
 
one is in a position of ontological dependency on the other (i.e. dependent on the 
other for one’s very being), is substituted for a sense of relatedness and attachment to 
him based on genuine mutuality. [...] Therefore, the polarity is between complete 
isolation or complete merging of identity rather than between separateness and 
relatedness. The individual oscillates perpetually between the two extremes, each 
equally unfeasible. 
 
This oscillation is compounded in the contemporary media landscape by the fact that the 
entire ecosystem is underpinned by (and is reliant upon) networks of data. Several recent 
studies that engage with aspects of political economic critique of data generation, 
management and monetisation (e.g. Allmer 2015; Fuchs 2012, 2013, 2014; McChesney 
2013; Srnicek 2017; Terranova 2004) tend to highlight the enormity and sheer amount of 
data, and the valuation of that data as a commodity in driving global digital economies. 
There are fewer studies that explicitly engage the affective and psychological position of the 
individual subject in relation to either the identification of self with data presence, or to self-
identification with one’s data profile, especially in relation to psychic processes (notable 
exemptions include Balick 2014b; Krüger & Johanssen 2014; Singh 2017). 
 
Accessibility of convergent media content, in its various formats, using various platforms 
and hardware, and from an array of access points, is becoming open to increasingly 
individual, personalised choices. This condition lies at the very heart of what might be 
described as a Web 2.0 ethic of connectivity: the notion that media forms are inclusive, 
participatory, writable from the perspective of an end-user, immediate and, ultimately, 
democratised through practices of access, sharing and gift economies. At the front-end of 
these services, it would seem that the extent of that freedom of choice, of paramount 
importance in a deregulated media ecosystem, signifies an individuated agency that is at 
once participatory and empowering. However, this position has increasingly become prone 
to criticism from a number of disciplinary approaches where, even at this front-end of 
service provision, choice has an illusory dimension (see, for example, Zelenkauskaite 2016). I 
refer here to the algorithms associated with, for example, massively popular streaming 
services – specifically, Amazon Prime, Netflix, or YouTube serve as key examples. These 
services operate within economies of attention and affect to present the consumer with 
 
 
front-end suggestions according to not only personal preferences based upon prior 
consumer choices (a narrowcast-based, ‘pull’ tendency), but also complexities associated 
with third-party arrangements for profile and data monetisation, and content provision (a 
more ostensibly broadcast-based ‘push’ tendency, partially based on long-tail economic 
models). 
 
Another case in point here: various algorithms have been developed to increase market 
potential for YouTube producers – note the use of that term, ‘producers’, which is a 
professionalised recuperation of the more interactive, participatory and amateur-ish 
‘produsage’ model often referred to in Web 2.0 scholarship (e.g. Bruns 2008). As if to 
illustrate the extent of this recuperative turn, for example, DigitasLBi and Outrigger Media 
developed OpenSlate – social media analytics platform partnered with YouTube and 
designed to anticipate stars of the future before they break. The results of analysis guide 
investment choices for corporate players to develop new online talent, and decrease risks of 
such investments whilst simultaneously increasing the chances of return on investment. 
Essentially, according to Learmonth (2013), OpenSlate produces predictive, qualitative data 
of a kind not available from YouTube’s own analytics systems. Webster (2014) stated that, 
at his time of writing, OpenSlate tracked over fifty thousand channels, and twenty-five 
million individual videos on YouTube, giving scores based upon specific qualitative criteria: 
audience engagement, frequency of new content added, influence and reach.1 For Webster, 
‘It’s possible the talent identified in this way would hit it big without intervention. But using 
metrics to identify winners can create winners. Unlike the weather, social predictions can 
change outcomes’; and, unlike in the physical world, predictive ‘algorithms powered by big 
data have the potential to create “self-fulfilling prophecies” in the social world’ (2014: 93). 
 
Although writing about a slightly different aspect of the data studies field, one of the more 
radically-infused book-length critiques of this logic can be found in the aforementioned 
work of Deborah Lupton – The Quantified Self (2016). To reiterate, Lupton’s study explores 
the forms and practices of self-tracking via various lifestyle applications powered by Web 
                                                          
1 At time of writing, according to OpenSlate’s own website, they have the ability to track over 400 million 
videos on YouTube, illustrating the incremental velocity of scale involved in this sector of advertising. 
https://www.openslate.com/context/ [Accessed: 21/05/2018]. 
 
 
2.0 connectivity, from a critical sociological perspective. Once again, the mass popularity of 
these technologies should not be underestimated – this is at the very popular end of 
popular culture. Such self-tracking practices – the phenomenon of FitBit for example, or any 
number of applications associated with measurements of body-mass indexing, jogging-route 
mapping, stepometers, and other wearable technologies or mobile phone applications, all 
form familiar aspects of everyday media engagement, as well as, one could argue, 
impression management. The implications of Lupton’s work also necessitate that one 
considers ways in which such practices partake of a broader culture associated with self-
improvement, modification and technologies of well-being or work productivity within 
relations of power. I have discussed some of the intimate correlations and dialogues 
between self-image, lifestyle and cultures of self-improvement elsewhere (Singh 2015) so I 
do not wish to repeat too much on that here, but it is noteworthy that such questions have 
begun to be addressed from a post-Jungian critique.2  
 
Although social media platforms and other Web 2.0 technologies may be identified with 
affirmative possibilities for expressive freedom, lifestyle, politics (transgression, action or 
subversion), they equally have tendencies to exacerbate what Laing described as the 
otherwise ‘normal’ pathological split between an ‘inner’ self and a generalized deadness of 
the embodied ‘false-self’. Elsewhere, I have argued that in contemporary media ecosystems, 
interactions can quickly disaggregate into moral positions of diminished recognition of 
others as whole persons with unique interests. This false-self attitude is characterised by an 
objectification of others, an amplification of unreal perceptions, unreal expectations and 
futile actions, the kinds of which are encountered in, and mobilise online filter bubbles 
(Singh 2018: n.p.). 
 
This is perhaps expressed best in Laing’s vicious circle of falsity; that: ‘Love is precluded and 
dread takes its place’, where ‘The self by its detachment is precluded from a full experience 
of realness and aliveness’ (1965: 82). Nowhere is this demonstrated to its most complete 
degree than in the false ideal of body image found in image-driven social media platforms, 
                                                          
2 Indeed, for the range of subjects and positions taken on self-improvement and transformation, see the 
whole collection within which that specific work sits: Hockley and Fadina (eds.) (2015). 
 
 
where people are both quick to judge bodies, and quick to call out body-shaming. On the 
one hand, if we enter into this point of debate, there is a sense of reification of self and 
other: we are fundamentally disembodied from ourselves in the sense of over-identifying 
with persona(e) in a false-self system, thus foreclosing on lived, warm relationships based 
on mutuality. On the other, the body itself becomes a sublime reified object, coded as an 
idealised unit of exchange, where selfies are currency for the mobilisation of identity in 
social exchange. Furthermore, such identity is bound up with a notion of data, such that it is 
reduced to a set of preferences and, ultimately, a quantification of choice (a system of 
presets and ‘preferences’), out of which, contained choices present themselves. In the 
image-driven emphasis of optic-privileged culture, the evidential value of the selfie (Walker 
Rettberg 2014; Sturken and Cartwright 2000) as expression of lifestyle should not be 
underestimated: both in the sense of its representational face-value aspect, and in its 
monetized data-value aspect. If nothing else, the phenomenon of the selfie demonstrates 
that we are, in the false-self system of social media, quite literally what we consume; or, we 
are nothing. 
 
The aspect of Lupton’s work that I would like to emphasise in relation to these issues 
through dialogue with some of the post-Jungian ideas around psychologies of the self I 
outlined a moment ago, is her emphasis on the ways in which practices of self-tracking are 
‘spreading from the private realm into diverse social domains, and the implications of the 
self-tracking phenomenon for the politics of personal data, data practices and data 
materialisations’ (2016: 1). In other words, the intensification of private experience is being 
drawn into the social. Indeed, we saw a speculative dramatization of this in the chapter’s 
opening example from ‘The Entire History of You’, where intensely private aspects of the 
personality (perspective, memory) are being disclosed openly, and relational aspects (sexual 
congress) are subject to atomised privacy. Additionally, according to some research, this 
tracking includes intensification of privatised places of work, institutions, and other 
transactional spaces, where the labouring body is objectified, and the imperative to 
perform, has become internalised (Moore and Robinson 2015). The vehicle through which 




This is where the idea of a false-self system starts to make more sense. The quantification 
(at least, the attempted quantification) of selfhood through standardised systems of profile 
building, data-mining and so on in everyday online transactions, is a totalised and totalising 
system of sorts. Underpinned by data identity, social media interactions of various 
descriptions systematically push towards traffic increase. The most obvious way to achieve 
this is through pushing what is already conventional and popular, risk-averse, and culturally-
immediate. This totalising, recuperative movement is found in the diversity of cases I have 
discussed so far in this book. For instance, the impact of multichannel networks often 
owned by major media multinationals such as Maker Studios (Disney), machinima.com 
(owned by Time Warner), and the music-oriented content of Vevo (Universal Music Group, 
Sony Music Entertainment and Warner Music Group). Additionally, the role of 
microcelebrities, characters and influencers to draw traffic through personality attraction 
and endorsement (such as Shay Carl Butler, Colleen Ballinger and many others), Instagram 
and other platform stardom (and in the case of Essena O’Neill, an extreme example of 
totalising image convention). These visible cases overlay an invisible foundation level of data 
appropriation, mining, analytics and manipulation operating at the back end of Web 2.0 
technologies, driving smart tech interaction, and providing frictionless consumer profiling. 
 
Although on an everyday level as consumers, we may not be aware of, nor necessarily 
concerned with, the transactional character of these aspects of data-driven identity, these 
are questions in need of address. As discussed in Chapter Five at length, the experiential, 
existential human self is not expressive of, nor can it be expressed in, data. Identities of 
various descriptions might be materialised through data, and this is an interesting notion, 
but it is misleading to attempt an elision of identity with expressions of selfhood here. An 
authentic sense of self cannot be sustained through data transactions, nor a sense of self be 
managed by and through data, for similar reasons. Individuality may be identifiable as and 
through data-driven systems of identity, but in this kind of ‘self system’, the notion of self is 
reduced to the status of ident, brand-presence and lifestyle choice. To refer to previous 
discussions, in this sense, the ‘falsity’ of this false-self refers not to fakery or imagined 
selves, but to a sense of the untrue, and the inauthentic, as in: ‘untrue to itself’. Presets and 
preference settings, vicariously shared through social media updates and ostentatiously 
pushed through practices such as ‘Like-farming’, Snapchat ‘streaks’ and other methods used 
 
 
by ordinary users to acquire some aspect of recognitive contact, are in danger of being 
misrecognised (by systems as well as by users themselves) as expressions of the whole 
person. As we have seen in the various discussions on recognition offered over the course of 
this book, this is a fundamental ethical and existential error. 
 
If further support for this argument is needed, we might appeal to Hegelian intersubjectivity 
and Hegel’s well-known account of the struggle for recognition in Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1994 [1807]) to tease out what is necessarily ‘false’ about this particular kind of ‘self 
system’. This argument is relevant as an influential precursor to relational psychology’s 
intersubjective interaction between more than one psyche as meaningful interaction. 
Following Aristotle’s notion that one’s relationship to others always runs parallel to one’s 
relationship with oneself, Hegel’s idea of self-consciousness is as a self-consciousness 
existing only as something recognised. The need for others outweighs every other need or 
desire, and this is a crucial precondition in any society that pertains to conviviality as a ‘living 
together’ or ‘living well’ ethical value. Hegel writes that ‘Self-Consciousness must orient 
itself toward superseding the other independent being, in order to become certain of itself 
thereby, as the being that it is; it must concomitantly be oriented toward superseding itself 
(since this “other” is itself)’ (1994: 51, §180 [emphasis in original]). In other words, self-
consciousness must negotiate with an other (self-)consciousness, recognising itself in the 
other in order to become certain of itself, so that eventually, ‘The consciousnesses 
recognize themselves as mutually recognizing each other’ (1994: 53, §184 [emphasis in 
original]). However, false-self systems seek, through this process, to define self-
consciousness as individuated, and this mutuality is subject to various intermediaries of the 
kinds just described. This intermediation is a problem for a consciousness that desires to be 
recognised as itself, above all else. As (Hegel translator) Kainz notes (1994: 50, note 5) in his 
annotated edition of Phenomenology of Spirit: 
 
[…] a human being’s existence as a self-consciousness is in a very real sense 
dependent on recognition by alter egos; so that if […] someone were to exist without 





An argument could be made here that, in a media ecosystem defined through social 
interactions that are mediated through data materialisation, the moment and sustaining of 
recognition in order to maintain a sense of life and security overrides other principles (and 
this could include moral ones). Such an argument also recognises that freedom (to act, 
speak, assemble – in general, but also specifically, in social media interactions and Web 2.0 
activities) is a commodity in the exchange of recognition. It permits, in a synoptic sense, the 
licence to say and act in ways that surpass moral value and social obligation. This is because, 
in a recognition economy driven through data materialisation, one’s only obligation would 
be to recognise another as another would recognise you – however negative or alienated.  
 
In human interactions, healthy personas are characterised by both robustness and strong 
differentiation. However, social media communications have an in-built tendency for 
communication shorthand, and this tendency systematically favours the personally 
convenient, and the immediacy of identification with persona as a quick-response, ‘easy 
version’ of the self. On this basis, assumed versions of oneself and others have a tendency 
to become estranged; and relations become objectified. Self, in this sense, is systemic and 
simulated, rather than expressed in any strong sense by the user; and the routines that 
characterise the practices of ‘quantified self’ movement (Lupton 2016) are the governing 
principle at the data level in all social media platforms (Singh 2017). 
 
To take trolling as an example of this sort of objectification that lies upon a more visible 
level to the user (i.e. comments threads), although an act ostensibly subject to popular 
criticism trolling also becomes, controversially, something of an exonerated act. This is 
because it ostensibly fulfils the logic underpinning obligations of recognition in the most 
superficial, non-mutual sense: I recognise you, albeit negatively, because I either respond to 
something you have posted online, or, I deliberately provoke you into a false debate on a 
controversial subject. It also expresses a vulgar definition of freedoms of speech (advocates 
of which, have been popularly described in online contexts as ‘speechers’) without fully 
acknowledging the responsibilities that necessarily associate themselves with those 
freedom rights: you recognise me because, albeit negatively, I have expressed a right to 
freedom of speech. In such unfortunate, somewhat solipsistic circumstances, in the practice 
 
 
of trolling the consciousnesses do not recognise themselves as mutually recognising others 
with independent and unique interests.  
 
The problem here rests on the notion that recognition is not only affirmative in the positive 
sense of life affirmation but is also subject to, and circumscribed by, conditions through 
which that recognition takes place (a commodified and commodifying environment). In this 
case, a data materialisation is built within various instances of capital (economic, social, 
cultural, and – perhaps most immediate and potent given the mediated environment of 
social interactions in Web 2.0 contexts – symbolic). Additionally, the limits of recognition are 
also shaped through the predominant value system: a value system that takes freedom of 
speech to its limits and beyond, whilst ignoring the parameters of responsibility and justice 
associated with those rights in moral and legal frameworks is a value system that, however 
misplaced, exonerates trolling and other forms of cyberbullying. Essentially, what we are 
dealing with therefore, is a variation on Hegel’s ‘unhappy consciousness’, described by 
Robert Sinnerbrink as an alienated form of subjectivity: ‘As Hegel contends, however, 
alienation can be overcome only through the rational comprehension of our historical 
condition and through the social achievement of mutual recognition’ (2007: 55 [my 
emphasis]). So, whereas it may first appear that dialectical movement of recognition is 
corrupted through the conditions of commodity-identity and data materialisation prevalent 
in social media interaction, that effectively fuels corrosive practices such as trolling, the 
principle of mutuality once more provides a solution. This time, mutuality augments the 
self-psychology of Kohut and Benjamin, and the philosophical anthropology of Honneth, 
with an appeal to Hegelian phenomenology, and to his philosophy of right. 
 
This leads us to another aspect of Laing’s work that fully appreciates the necessity to engage 
productive and positive aspects of interpersonal interaction. In addition to the vicious circle 
of the false-self, Laing describes mutual recognition between persons as a benign circle, a 
‘mutual enrichment of self and other’. He writes that ‘The reality of the world and of the self 
are mutually potentiated by the direct relationship between self and other’ (1965: 82). For 
Laing, this mutuality forms the intersubjective basis of an existential equilibrium. He 
furthers this observation by emphasising the fundamental expression of mind, body and 
world as a creative expression of consciousness, in a relationship with other 
 
 
consciousnesses. However, without a principle of mutuality guiding the full recognition of 
others as whole persons with autonomous interests, this expression is impossible. He states 
(1965: 84) that without such mutuality,  
 
What one might call a creative relationship with the other, in which there is a mutual 
enrichment of the self and the other (benign circle) is impossible, and an interaction 
is substituted which may seem to operate efficiently and smoothly for a while but 
which has no ‘life’ in it (sterile relationship). There is a quasi-it-it interaction instead 
of an I-thou relationship. This interaction is a dead process. (1965: 82 [emphasis in 
original]). 
 
To avoid dead, ‘quasi’, inauthentic interactions, and to reinvigorate the I-thou status of fully 
recognitive being, Laing’s creative relationship necessitates a leap of faith to retain a warm, 
lived sense of mutuality. I argue that it involves risk in revealing enough of oneself to 
another to facilitate the openness that trust requires to establish mature relationships. It 
also requires a full recognition that the contemporary communications media ecosystem 
does not necessarily have the capacity to facilitate such openness, because of the 
representational regime and data materialisation of online identity as if it were the whole 
thing (a self). To borrow once more from Aaron Balick, ‘Pathology develops only when the 
individual identifies with their persona at the expense of other attributes of their 
personality: when they believe the persona to be ‘the whole thing’ (2014b: 16). The 
‘pathology’ at work here, is the inauthentic false-self. 
 
Social Media and the Complex of Authenticity 
 
Following Joseph Henderson’s pioneering typology of social, aesthetic, philosophical and 
spiritual dynamics, the psychiatrist and Jungian analyst Thomas Singer (2000, 2004), along 
with his colleague Samuel L. Kimbles (2000) developed the concept of the ‘cultural 
complex’. This is a term which derives specifically from the notion of ‘complex’ found in the 
analytical psychology of Jung and post-Jungian thought. In this school, complexes operate at 
the personal level, and are made up of the building blocks of the psyche, often experienced 
as partial personalities or distinct psychological entities. Ultimately, these experiences 
 
 
derive from the tensions and interplay between archetypal, unconscious materials in the 
psyche, and the necessity to deal with the outside world. The term ‘complex’ is often used 
in depth traditions to describe the constellation of affects, images, emotionally-charged 
associations and collective psychic material.  
 
The ‘cultural complex’ is a development of the original term in post-Jungian thought and 
psychotherapy. It came about through a necessity to acknowledge the role of interaction 
between intrapsychic processes of individuals and those of others; and, also between the 
psychic world and the world of the social in general. The cultural complex describes 
powerful moods and behaviours characterised by repetition, lived out at a cultural level as 
part of a zeitgeist of attitudes, behaviours and worldviews. In time, these tend to become 
internalised by individuals through various identification processes, and accepted as certain 
ways of thinking about and doing things (although crucially, remaining not necessarily the 
best way to think and do). Singer writes that, ‘For Jungians, Henderson’s work opened the 
door to the vast realm of human experience that inhabits the psychical space between our 
most personal and our most archetypal level of being in the world’ (2004: 19). He goes on to 
suggest that, ‘like personal complexes, cultural complexes provide a simplistic certainty 
about the group’s place in the world in the face of otherwise conflicting and ambiguous 
uncertainties’ (2004: 21). It is a process whereby one’s own sense of self mingles with larger 
notions of identity in a collective sense, and then further: when one’s own cultural 
complexes mingle with other cultural complexes in reciprocal amplification. As Singer (2004: 
32) writes: 
 
We hold up strange mirrors to ourselves and to one another when we start to 
explore cultural complexes as part of our personal and historical development. Our 
cultural complexes get all mixed up not only with our personal history and 
complexes but with other cultural complexes as well. 
 
There is, arguably, a more materialist outlook to the notion of cultural complex when 
compared to the classical Jungian notion of personal complex: it tends to emphasise the 
social, and may be regarded as fundamentally historical in its character, as it reflects 
diachronic shifts in modes of worldview, shaping norms and values over time. However, this 
 
 
is a sense of personal or shared history that is present, that is unfolding as one interacts 
with others and with the world. It is almost as if an aesthetic of being operates through this 
experience and gives one a sense of being present, and alive in the moment. It is therefore a 
powerfully seductive aspect of authenticity and carries with it a sense of both identity and 
recognition. 
 
I would argue that the notion of authenticity, although certainly mythic in character 
(certainly in the kinds of aesthetic experiences just described), and problematic in its 
relationship with essentialist truth claims and so on, relates closely to the notion of cultural 
complex. This is particularly the case when the struggle for authenticity, for a feeling that is 
true to oneself, is amplified through social media interactions. Indeed, one might tentatively 
argue that authenticity is itself an instance of complex. I have noted elsewhere, for example, 
that persona tends to amplify the individual, and likewise, the interaction of cultural 
complexes will amplify and extend conventions of worldview, and of social interaction. So, 
persona on an interpersonal level (the psychological operations that reveal and conceal to 
keep the personality intact), and cultural complexes of authenticity at a wider level (that 
address the social necessity to express and remain ‘true’ to oneself, in the individualist 
sense) together, distort the view of the true self for others. However, as I have mentioned 
elsewhere (Singh 2017) it is never fully a false-self that is presented. The term ‘false’ is not 
intended to signify ‘inauthentic’. As already noted in a number of contexts during the course 
of this book, inauthenticity as a concept ought to be reserved for cases where individuals 
and others identify with the false-self as if that is all there were. This appears to be a 
characteristic of zeitgeist, and reflects the complexity (and arguably, the complex) of the 
struggle for authenticity. 
 
In order to complete this argument, I turn once again to the thought of Charles Taylor. His 
work on the intensification of privatised experiences, and the inflated cultural value of what 
he terms ‘self-realisation’ (closely related to the concepts and practices of individualism, 
self-actualisation, and ‘lifestyle’ individuation), is of particular interest here. He writes that 
the contemporary culture of authenticity, which characterises modern life, ‘encourages a 
purely personal understanding of self-fulfilment, thus making the various associations and 
communities in which the person enters purely instrumental in their significance. At the 
 
 
broader social level, this is antithetical to any strong commitment to a community’ (1991: 
43). This increasingly intensified, private experience intimately fosters a transactional 
approach to relationships, where one’s relationships are viewed as being subservient to 
personal fulfilment. For Taylor, as it stands, the predominant and impoverished principle of 
individualism does not offer a view on how individuals should live with others. It is a curious 
echo of the convivialist ethos, coupled with echoes of Hegel’s struggle for recognition, as 
well as the psychosocial principle of mutuality that I have mapped out in this book. Taylor’s 
acknowledgement of the problem speaks to an unfolding and unfoldedness of inter-
subjective (social) being that seems to be all but absent in the transactional and data-driven 
versions of selfhood promoted through social media interactions. He writes (1991:47-48) 
that 
 
My discovering my identity doesn’t mean that I work it out in isolation but that I 
negotiate it through dialogue, partly overt, partly internalized, with others. That is 
why the development of an ideal of inwardly generated identity gives a new and 
crucial importance to recognition. My own identity crucially depends on my 
dialogical relations with others. 
 
That he had already identified such problems in the ‘culture of authenticity’ many years 
before the advent of social media, and indeed predating the Web by some several years, the 
amplified effects of such impoverished recognitive forms within contemporary always-on 
contexts gives cause for concern. But this also provides an opportunity to engage with some 
of the solutions laid down in a number of traditions of thought and praxis discussed at 
length during the course of the current study. Taylor is optimistic. He argues that it is 
difficult to believe that people are so locked into social and material conditions such as the 
atomist, instrumental, transactional relations that seem to characterise modern life, that 
they are not able to make positive change, and embrace a more authentic approach to 





[…] while everyone must recognize how powerfully we are conditioned by our 
industrial technological civilization, those views that portray us as totally locked in 
and unable to change our behaviour short of smashing the whole ‘system’ have 
always seemed to me wildly exaggerated. 
 
As any reader who has read thus far would be able to discern, I have some sympathy with 
this view. Indeed, so does Jaron Lanier in a couple of distinct ways: expressions of his 
vehement anti-Marxism (2006), aside (which in some ways nonetheless align with Taylor’s 
call to retain the current social apparatus, but transform its content), the strong individualist 
stance that Lanier expresses in many of his published projects (2010, 2013) has much in 
common with Taylor’s view. Furthermore, the language that Taylor chooses here is 
significant for Lanier. ‘Lock-in’ is, of course, a technical term widely used in the field of 
human-machine interactions. It is used by Lanier in that sense, but he also uses it to 
extrapolate the trajectory of human-machine interactions, to attempt to figure out how and 
why human-human relationships, and the interactions individuals have within wider 
communities, correlate with locked-in technological and social practices. Again, in an echo 
of Lanier’s critique of degraded social interactions on SNS platforms, discussed in some 
detail in previous chapters, Taylor suggests a methodology to address the ‘debased’ 
practices of misrecognition. He writes (1991: 72) that we need to 
 
[…] undertake a work of retrieval, that we identify and articulate the higher ideal 
behind the more or less debased practices, and then criticize these practices from 
the standpoint of their own motivating ideal. In other words, instead of dismissing 
this culture altogether, or just endorsing it as it is, we ought to attempt to raise its 
practice by making more palpable to its participants what the ethic they subscribe to 
really involves. 
 
This necessitates a meaningful involvement in taking up an ethical position, and again, in 
making a leap of faith. The future may appear to offer only ever-increasing levels of inward-
looking, privatised concerns. It may be the case that a variety of factors, including increased 
precarity, enforced mobility, and jobs and situations that demand we act or behave more 
 
 
transactionally towards one another, all characterise contemporary lifestyles, particularly in 
the so-called developed world. This is a depressing thought, and if taken in the rather mean 
spirit of much popular commentary where, particularly young people, are inwardly and 
narcissistically concerned with their own intensely privatised concerns, then it is true for 
Taylor that we are indeed running out of alternatives to reverse such trends. However, to 
affirm Taylor’s optimism, he also contends (1991: 76-77) that: 
 
This perspective is different if you see these developments in the light of the ethic of 
authenticity. For then they don’t just represent a shift in value that is unproblematic 
for the people concerned. Rather, you see the new, self-centred practices as the site 
of an ineradicable tension. The tension comes from the sense of an ideal that is not 
being fully met in reality. And this tension can turn into a struggle, where people try 
to articulate the shortfall of practice, and criticize it. 
 
Struggle means that things can go either way, which for Taylor at least means that there is 
good news and bad news. But this struggle brings with it the potential to push forwards, 
towards the ideal, and that decline and triviality are not inevitable. And again, this suggests 
that same leap of faith. But this leap also requires a sense of the social imaginary – the place 
where Laing’s ‘creative relationship’ is allowed to flourish and express itself to the fullest 
degree, and where a sense of conviviality can gain social aspects that reinforce the 
psychological. I am here minded of Sartre’s work in The Psychology of The Imagination 
(2001). In his book, Sartre writes (2001: 169 [emphasis in original]) that 
 
To prefer the imaginary is not only to prefer a richness, a beauty, an imaginary luxury 
to the existing mediocrity, in spite of their unreal nature. It is also to adopt 
‘imaginary’ feelings and actions for the sake of their imaginary nature. It is not only 
this or that image that is chosen, but the imaginary state with everything it implies; it 
is not only an escape from the content of the real (poverty, frustrated love, failure of 
one’s enterprise, etc.), but from the form of the real itself […] the very way our 




This is an expression of authenticity in its positive, truest sense. It is an opt-in, positive 
solution to what is often seen as a negative problem, demanding subtractive or censorious 
solutions. In the context of Web 2.0, these taken the familiar discursive form of a number of 
everyday issues – moral panics about children with technology, for example; the 
surveillance anxieties of modern state and corporate data practices; or the accompanying 
paternalist censorship that forms around National Webs and so-called safe spaces. Seeing 
the imaginary in this creative way transforms our understanding of social being from one 
dominated by a transactional, neoliberal economism that dominates cultural life today, to 
one that seems, through the imaginative world of recognition, more to do with the 
expression of interior lives, and the potentialities of convivial, lived mutuality. That 
transactional culture, to which I have alluded several times throughout this book, underpins 
the majority of social interactions via Web 2.0 technologies through data materialisation 
and the fixity of image-driven social pressures. Holding up Sartre’s reading of the imaginary 
and Laing’s notion of the creative relationship with the other, one can see another path to 
tread. 
 
Our intuition may tell us that we are warm, living, social, emotional, sensible, animated, 
thinking things; that we are, in fact, human beings, (mostly) being human. Whereas the 
Black Mirror instance at the beginning of this chapter may well be an extrapolation of 
existing affordances between technology, the sexual and the social, nonetheless, one can 
see the ways in which technological intermediaries compel us towards reified relations, 
amplifying an already delicate state in the intrapsychic balance between self and other. 
Indeed, a more materialist argument might suggest that our human relationships in general 
are thus in danger of becoming relations between things – the ‘being’ part of ‘human being’ 
melting into air as the objectification mechanisms of commodity-identity and reification 
become more prevalent. Indeed, at the height of modernity, these mechanisms were 
identifiable, well-known even. In History and Class Consciousness, for example, Georg 
Lukács, (1990: 83) wrote that 
 
The essence of commodity-structure has often been pointed out. Its basis is that a 
relation between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires a 
 
 
‘phantom objectivity’, an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing 
as to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people. 
 
In this phantasmal, transactional rationality, Lukács identified commodity as a sort of 
structuring principle of everyday life, defining our sense of individuality, and well as setting 
the terms for social, institutional and political relations. To put it another way, our warm, 
lived psychology is disassembled through a reduction to ‘thingness’. However, because we 
are not really things in the sense of inanimate, inorganic or cold things our intuition should 
push us towards finding a solution to accommodate the desire for recognition as whole 
persons with autonomous and unique interests. One way of dealing with this, tarrying with 
materialist terminology of commodity, is to develop the notion that commodity is a 
structuring principle by reimagining commodity as a recognitive principle of mutuality. 
Whether we can get to this point in our dealings with the legacy of Web 2.0 technologies, 
practices and principles is another question, and in my concluding remarks, I tentatively 
offer some explorations. 
